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Doubts about Aid'
Keith Griffin
Liberal and progressive people have few doubts about
foreign aid, or indeed about the beneficent role of
foreign capital in general, of which of course aid is
only one form.2 Most of the doubts, or at least the
most outspoken criticisms, seem to come from the
right of the political spectrum [Bauer 1971:96-1351,
from people who question on philosophical grounds
the case for an international redistribution of income
and who argue on empirical grounds that aid in
practice has strengthened the state relative to the
private sector, has promoted central planning and
weakened the market mechanism and more often than
not has supported despotism rather than liberty.
I do not share the philosophical objections of the
political right to foreign aid. I favour a more equitable
distribution of world income, and have no objection to
using government taxation to bring about the desired
redistribution of resources and purchasing power. My
doubts about aid arise not from predispositions
derived from theory but from observation of the
impact of aid programmes in the Third World.
The Volume of Aid
Whatever one's views on aid, however, it is important
to keep it in perspective. So much has been written on
the subject, particularly in the West, that one could
easily get the impression that the volume of aid is
considerable and increasing. This would be quite
wrong. Indeed, whether one sees aid through the eyes
of a donor or of a recipient, the volume of foreign aid is
small, and - in several senses - lower today than two
decades ago, as is confirmed by Table 1.
This will appear in slightly altered form as Chapter 9 in my
forthcoming book, World Hunger and the World Economy
(Macmillan, 1987).
2 See, for example. Iwo international reports which ably summarise
liberal opinion of the time: Partners in Development, the Report of
the Commission on International Development chaired by Lester B.
Pearson (Pall Mall Press, London, 1969) and North-South: A
Programme for Survival, the Report of the Independent
Commission on International Development issues chaired by Willy
Brandt (Pan Books, London. 1980).
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These data include only official aid, not flows from
NGOs (from Oxfam to the Ford and Rockefeller
Foundations). Moreover, the data refer to the 17
OECD countries only,3 and therefore exclude aid
provided by the socialist countries and by OPEC. Aid
from the socialist countries and from non-official
Western sources is of little quantitative significance
and can safely be ignored. Aid from the OPEC
countries, on the other hand, is more significant.
Following the sharp increase in oil prices in 1973 and
1974, the major oil-exporting countries did become
important aid donors. In 1980, for instance, aid from
OPEC countries accounted for 1.7 per cent of their
GNP or about 25 per cent of the total amount of
foreign aid provided by the non-socialist countries.
Nonetheless, the ratio of aid to GNP in the OPEC
countries has fallen rapidly since 1975 and even the
nominal amount of their aid now appears to be on the
decline. Thus the data in Table I are unlikely to be
misleading as regards general trends.
As can be seen in the first line of the Table, ODA
accounts for a very small fraction of the donor
countries' GNP, namely 0.35 per cent in 1981.
Furthermore, the ratio of foreign aid to donor country
GNP fell by 31 per cent between 1960 and 1981,
because the national income of the donor countries
grew at 4 per cent per year, while aid grew by only
2.2 per cent a year. In relative terms, the donor
countries have become less generous.
The picture is even less flattering when one examines
aid to the 34 'low-income countries' with a 1980 per
capita income of $400 or less, and when one takes into
account the fact that most foreign aid consists not of
grants but of loans which must be repaid with interest.
The net flow of bilateral aid to these, after deducting
repayments of capital and interest, is much smaller
than the gross flow, and has been falling. Between
The 17 countries that are members of the OECD are Italy, New
Zealand, the UK, Japan, Austria, Finland, Australia, Canada.
Netherlands, Belgium, France, USA, Denmark, Federal Republic
of Germany. Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.
Table 1
Official Development Assistance from the 17 OECD Countries
Source: IBRD, WorldDevelopment Report 1983 (Oxford University Press, 1983) World Development Indicators, Tables 1, 18 and 19
Note: All figures in the table are net of repayments of capital and interest
1960 and 1981, as can be seen in the third line of the
Table, bilateral aid to such countries, as a share of
donor GNP, declined by more than half and at the end
of the period comprised only 0.07 of one per cent of the
donor countries' GNP!
The situation is no better when viewed from the Third
World. Between 1960 and 1981 there was zero growth
in the amount of foreign aid received per head.
Happily, however, GNP per capita increased more
than three per cent a year in the Third World during
this period and consequently the ratio of aid inflows to
national product fell by nearly one half. As is evident
from Table 1, the net amount of official development
assistance per head was virtually the same at the
beginning and end of the period, and in a few
underdeveloped countries the net flow of official
foreign aid has become negligible.
Foreign Capital and the Industrial Countries
It is widely believed that if left to its own devices
private capital would naturally flow from the
advanced industrial economies to the underdeveloped
economies. In a sense, according to this view, foreign
aid is unnecessary, since the profit-maximising
behaviour of banks and of companies would lead
more or less automatically to a transfer of finance
capital and of private direct investment to the Third
World, where capital is in short supply and the rate of
return on investment should be high.
The validity of this belief, however, depends on the
assumptions that the same technology is available to
all countries, that there are no significant economies of
large-scale production and that there are no increasing
returns to investment or learning-by-doing effects.
If these assumptions are not valid, then the rate of
profit and the real rate of interest could well be higher
in the advanced industrial economies, so that private
capital would tend to move from the poor countries to
the rich and not the other way round [see Griffin 1978:
Introduction and Chapter 1]. That is, if the usual
neo-classical assumptions do not apply, one could well
find that advanced economies are net importers of
private capital, not net exporters.
In practice, most industrialised countries do appear to
be net recipients of total foreign capital - even after
taking foreign aid into account - and therefore, of
course, afortiori recipients of private capital (Table 2;
the 17 OECD countries, plus Spain and Ireland, are
ranked in ascending order of GNP per capita). We
compare two years: 1960, when growth rates were
rapid, and 1981, when real rates of interest were high.
In 1960, only five industrial countries were net
exporters of capital (Spain, Netherlands, France, the
United States and West Germany); four others were in
balance and the remaining 10 were net importers of
capital. That is, most industrialised economies
enjoyed a net inflow of capital. In 1981, four countries
(the UK, Japan, Netherlands and Norway) exported
capital, four were in balance and il imported capital.
Only one country, the Netherlands, had a net capital
outflow in both 1960 and 1981; 15 were net recipients
of foreign capital in at least one of the two years. Thus
even a cursory inspection of the data is enough to
dispel the notion that rich countries usually are large
exporters of capital to poor countries. In fact, in 1981
only the high income oil-exporting countries of Libya,
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates
were major suppliers of capital to the rest of the world.
Even this outflow has now dwindled.
Foreign Capital and Growth
Let us set this problem to one side, however, and
assume that the poor countries are in fact net
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1960 ¡970 1981
Official Development Assistance as percentage of GNP 0.51 0.34 0.35
Official Development Assistance per head of Third World population
(US dollars at constant 1980 prices) 7.77 6.81 7.73
Bilateral flow to 'low-income countries' of Official Development Assistance
as percentage of donor GNP 0.18 0.13 0.07
Table 2
Net Foreign Capital Inflow of 19 Industrial Market
Economy Countries
(per cent of GDP)
Source: IBRD, World Development Report 1983 (Oxford
University Press, 1983) World Development
Indicators, Table 5
Note: In this and subsequent tables and in the text the
'resource balance' is used as a proxy measure of net foreign
capital flows. Strictly speaking, this is inaccurate as the
resource balance term includes not only capital movements
but also remittances and 'errors and omissions'. Our broad
conclusions, however, are unaffected by the use of this
slightly wider concept as a proxy for capital flows.
recipients of foreign resources, je aid and private
foreign investment. What are the consequences of
this? The standard answer [see Chenery and Strout,
1966] is that foreign resources will supplement the
country's domestic savings effort and thereby raise the
rate of investment by the amount of the capital inflow.
This, in turn, will result in a faster rate of growth of
output and income and in a reduction in the incidence
of poverty. If, as is thought likely, the marginal
propensity to save exceeds the average, higher incomes
and faster growth fuelled by foreign capital should
result in a rising savings ratio, which would further
accelerate growth and hastén the time at which capital
imports would no longer be necessary. If, in addition,
foreign capital brings with it superior technology and
better management, the productivity of investment
should rise, thereby providing yet another reason for
growth to accelerate.
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In summary, the standard view is that capital imports
(i) raise the rate of investment directly, (ii) indirectly
raise the domestic savings rate and hence lead to a
further rise in the rate of investment, and (iii) raise the
incremental output-capital ratio. The combination of
these three effects implies that the rate of growth
should 'explode' in countries where foreign capital
inflows suddenly increase, and the rate of growth
should be high and rising in countries which enjoy
sustained high levels of aid and foreign private
investment. In both cases therefore the recipients
should experience rapid growth of per capita output
and a sharp fall in poverty. This obviously is an
attractive prospect to donors and recipients alike. The
question is whether the process described conforms to
reality or is merely the product of wishful thinking.
To help answer this question 12 countries have been
selected for scrutiny. These countries were not chosen
randomly but were selected for particular character-
istics. Thus the data are intended merely to illustrate
an argument, not to provide a definitive proof of any
particular proposition. Ten of the 12 countries are
classified by the World Bank as 'low-income
economies'. The two exceptions are Senegal and
Israel. Eight of the 12 are from Africa (the region
experiencing the most serious development problems),
the two largest are from Asia (the most populous
underdeveloped region), and there is one each from
the Caribbean and the Eastern Mediterranean. In
terms of the number of countries, therefore, the
sample is deliberately biased towards Africa, although
in terms of population, Pakistan and Bangladesh are
larger than all the others combined. In eight cases
there was a very sharp rise in net capital inflows
between 1960 and 1981 (our two reference years), and
in the other four cases net capital inflows in both years
were equivalent to at least six per cent of the country's
GDP and remained fairly close to the initially high
level. Thus the latter cases represent countries which
have experienced sustained high levels of capital
imports (Table 3).
All these countries are major recipients of foreign aid
and private foreign investment. Ethiopia had the
smallest net capital inflow in 1981, namely, $7.26 per
capita, yet even this virtually matched the average
receipts of official development assistance and
represented about six per cent of the country's GDP.
The next country, Zaire, received about twice as much
foreign capital per head as Ethiopia and was well
above world averages. The richest country in our
sample, Israel, hardly deserves to be classified by the
World Bank as a 'middle-income' developing
economy since its per capita income is similar to that
of Ireland and Spain, two 'industrial market economy'
countries. Indeed, in 1981 Israel's GNP per head was
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Foreign Capital and Economic Growth in 12 Selected Countries
received 90 times more foreign capital per head than
Ethiopia! That is, Ethiopia, arguably the most
backward economy in the world, [ILO/JASPA 1982]
received only a pittance compared to the prosperous
Israel. One can hardly imagine a more regressive
distribution of foreign capital.
Indeed, at least for the Table 3 countries, the higher a
country's GNP per head, the more foreign capital per
head it tends to receive. Yet orthodox theory, as we
have seen, would lead one to expect the opposite, ie
that capital would flow most strongly to the poor
countries, where capital is scarce and the return on
capital presumably is relatively high.
Equity requires that foreign capital should flow
disproportionately to the poor countries and if the
market mechanism cannot ensure this, then it becomes
particularly important that official aid should
discriminate strongly in favour of the poorest
countries. Unfortunately, however, this does not
occur. Indeed it has been apparent for a long time that
foreign aid accentuates international inequality
among Third World countries rather than reduces it.
That is, there is a positive correlation between per
capita aid and per capita income, and this is as true of
aid in general4 as of multilateral and bilateral5 aid
separately.
Source: IBRD, World Development Report 1983 (Oxford University Press, 1983) World Development Indicators, Tables 1, 2, 3, 5
and 19
Let us next consider the growth performance of our
sample countries. Firstly, in four cases GDP per head
actually declined during 1970-81: rapidly in Zaire and
Madagascar (3.2 and 2.3 per cent a year, respectively),
and quite rapidly in Senegal and the Central African
Republic (0.7 per cent a year in both countries).
Despite above-average inflows of foreign capital -
assuming, not unreasonably, that 1981 data were
reasonably typical - in three of the four countries
(Madagascar is a partial exception), it was not possible
to prevent economic decline and a substantial increase
in mass poverty. Second, in four other cases -
Ethiopia, Tanzania, Pakistan and Israel - the rate of
growth of per capita output was lower in 1970-81 than
it had been in 1960-70. Yet in none of these countries
was there a fall in foreign resource inflows.
Consider, for example, the net inflow per capita of 'public and
publicly guaranteed medium- and long-term loans' in 1981. The
'upper middle-income economies' received nearly 22 times more
than the 'low-income economies' and more than twice as much as
the 'lower middle-income economies'.
For an early study of the British case see the Report from the Select
Commiuee on Overseas Development, Session 1972-73, Minutes of
Evidence with Appendices, Vol. Il, 24 July 1973, Appendix 23 by
Keith Griffin and Frances Stewart, pp.320-4. Also see footnote Il
below. lt should be added that the British record in this respect is
less bad than that of most donors, because of the substantial amount
of UK aid that is allocated to South Asia.
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(per cent per annum)
1960-70 1970-8]
1. Bangladesh 140 19.70 1.2 1.6
2. Ethiopia 140 7.26 2.0 0.2
3. Zaire 210 14.44 1.4 -3.2
4. Tanzania 280 31.88 3.3 1.7
5. Haiti 300 37.41 -1.4 1.7
6. Benin 320 87.36 0.0 0.6
7. Central African
Republic 320 34.50 0.0 -0.7
8. Madagascar 330 25.69 0.7 -2.3
9. Pakistan 350 29.78 3.9 1.8
10. Sudan 380 47.13 -0.8 1.0
11. Senegal 430 86.88 0.2 -0.7
12. Israel 5160 654.00 4.6 1.4
Third, in only four countries, namely, Bangladesh,6
Haiti, Benin and the Sudan, was the growth of per
capita output faster in 1970-81 than in 1960-70, and in
each case the increase in foreign capital imports was
dramatic. Thus in Haiti the net foreign capital inflow
rose from two per cent of GDP in 1960 to 12 per cent in
1981 - 10 percentage points. In the Sudan, the rise
was 12 percentage points, in Bangladesh 16 percentage
points, and in Benin, 31 percentage points. (For these
four countries - and as an observation, not a
statistically significant finding - it is notable that the
increase in the rate of growth of GDP per head
between 1960-70 and 1970-8 1 was inversely related to
the growth in capital imports.)
The picture would be slightly different if one
substituted 1976 for 1981 in the comparison, but the
general point stands: the connection between an
increase in foreign capital and an increase in the rate of
growth, even if it is positive as one would expect, is
very weak. Indeed, in surprisingly many cases, the rate
of growth of output per head fell when capital imports
increased; in the four cases where growth accelerated,
the extent of acceleration appears almost to have been
inversely proportional to the increase in capital
imports.
Finally, nothwithstanding the fact that all 12 of our
sample countries were relatively large recipients of
foreign capital in 1970-8 1, not one managed to grow as
fast as the average of the 'low-income economies'.
This was mainly because of the big weight of countries
in Asia, which were mostly low capital recipients, and
because in Asia growth accelerated during the 1970s,
whereas there was a marked slowing down of growth
in our (mostly African) sample countries, with
particularly high capital inflows by LDC standards.
The best performance in the 1970s in our sample was
in Pakistan, where the rate of growth of GDP per head
was 1.8 per cent per annum, as compared to the
average for all 'low-income economies' of 2.6 per cent.
That is, our best performer was 31 per cent below
average. Even more disturbing, the unweighted
average growth rate in our 'high capital inflow' sample
in 1970-81 was only 0.3 per cent per annum per head,
or less than one-eighth as rapid as the average for the
low-income economies as a whole. Unless foreign
capital is channelled deliberately and systematically
by aid donors and overseas investors to slowly
growing economies (which is hardly plausible), one
must doubt the beneficial effects, enumerated above,
of foreign capital on growth.
Foreign Capital and Domestic Savings
A key assumption of the orthodox analysis is that
Bangladesh did not become an independent country until 1971.
Prior to that it was, of course, East Pakistan.
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capital imports are complementary rather than
competitive with domestic savings, both in the short
run (when foreign capital supplements local savings)
and in the longer run (when higher per capita incomes
lead to a higher domestic savings ratio). I have long
doubted the validity of this proposition, as it seems
very likely that an inflow of foreign resources in
practice will result in some combination of increased
expenditure on private consumption, armaments,
other forms of public consumption and investment.7
That is, once all general equilibrium effects are taken
into account, one should expect that a large
proportion of any injection of foreign capital
ultimately will be used to finance additional
consumption, and only a small proportion to finance
additional investment.
This view is one way of saying that in general the
increase in investment will be much less than the
increase in capital imports; as a logical corollary, the
domestic savings ratio will have declined. Foreign
capital, far from being associated with a rise in the
domestic savings ratio, is in practice associated with a
fall. A further implication is that, everything else being
equal, a given increase in capital imports will be
associated with a less than proportional increase in the
rate of growth. Admittedly, the growth rate should
accelerate; but if the decline in the domestic savings
rate is substantial, the acceleration is likely to be
modest.
These, then, are testable propositions. It is an
instructive heuristic first step, even for our non-
random sample of 'high capital inflow' countries, to
see how capital imports have been related to domestic
savings, and hence to investment (Table 4).
A number of interesting points arise from the Table.
First, in three cases (Bangladesh, Zaire and Tanzania)
foreign capital imports were negative in 1960. In other
words, these three countries were net suppliers of
capital to the rest of the world. Bangladesh was at that
time the province of East Pakistan, and was forced by
the central government of Pakistan to transfer
resources for the industrial development of West
Pakistan {Griffin and Khan eds. 1972: Commentary to
Part 11. Zaire was in its first year of independence - it
did not cease to be the Belgian Congo until 30 June
1960 - and no doubt the large capital outflow was
part of the pain that accompanied the birth of the new
nation. Tanzania was then the colony of Tanganyika
and had one year to go before independence. In each
My doubts were first expressed in Spanish 20 years ago in an article
published jointly with Ricardo Ffrench-Davis (1964). More refined
versions appeared at regular intervals. See, for example, Griffin
1969 ch. 3; Griffin and Enos 1970; Griffin 1978: ch. 3 and its
Appendix.
Table 4
Foreign Capital, Domestic Savings and Investment
(per cent of GDP)
case, therefore, there were special reasons for the
capital outflow.8
Second, in all 12 cases capital imports as a percentage
ofGDP were higher in 1981 than in 1960, and in every
case but one, they were higher in 1976 than in 1960. In
many cases, as mentioned earlier, the rise was
dramatic; in a few, the rise was relatively slight, eg the
Central African Republic and Madagascar; but in no
case did capital imports fall over the period as a whole.
The countries in our sample are among the relatively
small number where capital imports either were high
initially or rose sharply or both. In this respect they
can be considered to be rather privileged.
Third, in nine out of 12 cases the domestic savings
ratio fell between 1960 and 1981. In these cases there
was a clear inverse relationship between larger capital
inflows and lower domestic savings. Moreover,
fourth, in three cases the rate of domestic savings had
become negative by 1981. That is, foreign capital not
only financed all of the investment that took place in
the country but some of the consumption as well. In
5This does not imply, however, that conditions in these three
countries were unique. Several countries in our sample, for instance.
achieved independence in 1960, viz., Benin, Central African
Republic, Madagascar and Senegal.
Source: IBRD, World Development Report 1983, (Oxford University Press, 1983) World Development Indicators, Table 5.
The data for 1976 are from Table 5 of the 1978 Report
another case the domestic savings rate had fallen to
zero by 1981, implying that all of the investment in
that year was financed with foreign resources. These
four cases represent one-third of our sample.
The negative savings in Benin and Senegal are
associated with an exceptionally sharp rise in capital
imports. Indeed the increased inflow of foreign capital
was greater in these two countries than in any other
country in our sample, viz., 31 percentage points in
Benin and 21 in Senegal. In the Sudan, too, the zero
savings rate was associated with a substantial increase
in foreign capital from nothing in 1960 to 12 per cent
of GDP in 1981. In the Central African Republic the
domestic savings rate declined from nine per cent of
GDP in 1960 to minus three per cent in 1981, although
capital imports increased by only one percentage point
of GDP to 12 per cent.
Fifth, quite apart from changes in savings rates and in
the rate of foreign capital inflow, the data in Table 4
suggest that countries which receive large amounts of
foreign capital are likely to save rather little and,
conversely, countries which receive little foreign
capital are likely to have relatively high domestic











Bangladesh -1 7 15 8 -1 2 7 6 17
Ethiopia 1 1 6 11 9 4 12 10 10
Zaire -9 21 8 21 13 25 12 34 33
Tanzania -5 2 14 19 19 8 14 21 22
Haiti 2 4 12 7 7 1 9 11 13
Benin 6 16 37 9 4 -2 15 20 35
Central African
Republic 11 13 12 9 9 -3 20 22 9
Madagascar 6 -1 8 5 14 7 11 13 15
Pakistan 7 9 10 5 8 7 12 17 17
Sudan 0 10 12 12 8 0 12 18 13
Senegal 1 6 22 15 9 -5 16 15 17




plot for each of our 12 countries for 1960, 1976 and
1981 gross domestic savings against net foreign capital
inflows (both expressed as a percentage of GDP). The
inverse relationship is very clear9 and is consistent with
the results obtained in some other studies. [See, for
example, Weisskopf 1972; Newlyn 1977, ch. 4. For
some counter examples, however, see Lipton 1972.]
It is a characteristic of the social sciences, however,
that there are always counter-examples to any
generalisation. Our sixth point consists of three
exceptions to the rule that savings and capital inflows
are inversely associated. In Zaire, Madagascar and
Pakistan the savings rate was higher in 1981 than in
1960 and rose roughly in parallel with a rise in foreign
capital inflows. Thus the inverse relationship we have
identified is far from inevitable. There is, however, a
9The regression equation is: S = 12.0-0.48 F; R2 = 0.40 where S =
gross domestic savings as a percentage of GOP and F = net foreign
capital inflow as a percentage of GOP.
sting in the tail: in all three cases the rate of growth of
output per head declined, despite higher savings,
larger capital imports and greater investment! In
Pakistan the growth rate fell by more than a half and in
Zaire and Madagascar the growth rate became
negative. Clearly aid, private foreign investment and a
greater savings effort were unable to prevent a sharp
deterioration in macroeconomic performance.
Foreign Capital and Investment
Normally, of course, the outcome is not quite so
disappointing. Our analysis indicates that capital
imports should lead to a rise in total investment, but
by less than the amount of foreign capital received.
Higher investment, in turn, should result in faster
growth, everything else being equal.
The data in Table 4 tend to support the hypothesis as
regards investment. In nine countries gross investment
as a percentage of GDP was higher in 1981 than in
1960. This is what one would expect. In three cases,
however, the investment ratio fell. In Ethiopia the fall
was from 12 per cent ofGDP to 10 per cent and reflects
a decision by the military government to seek a
military solution to the country's political and social
problems. In Israel the fall in the investment rate was
even larger - from 27 to 20 per cent of GDP - and
was caused by a huge increase in military expenditure. °
In the Central African Republic the rate of investment
plummeted after 1976 and as a consequence per capita
income was lower at the end of the 1970s than at the
beginning.
At the other extreme, the rate of investment increased
by more than the rise in foreign capital in Zaire,
Madagascar and Pakistan where, as we have seen, the
domestic savings ratio rose.
In between are the countries where investment
increased but by less, usually much less, than the rise in
capital imports: Senegal capital inflows increased by
21 per cent of GDP, but the investment ratio rose by
only one percentage point); Sudan, 12 and one
percentage points; Haiti, 10 and four percentage
points. If one considers the unweighted average of the
12 countries, gross investment increased by 4.5 per
cent of GDP while capital imports rose by 11.6 per
cent of GDP. That is, the increase in investment was
equivalent to only 39 per cent of the increase in foreign
capital.
Investment and Growth
Still, investment did increase on average. What is
remarkable is that the rate of growth of GDP per head
1 Between 1972 and 1980 military expenditure in Israel rose from 17.6









increased in only four countries, as we saw earlier. In
the other eight countries the rate of growth was lower
in 1970-81 than in 1960-70, although in five of these
the investment ratio increased. There is thus a strong
suspicion that increased inflows of foreign capital
might have led to a decline in the productivity of
investment. Moreover, in some cases the decline in the
productivity of investment might have been greater
than the increase in the rate of investment, so that the
rate of growth of output fell.
There are reasons to believe that foreign aid in
particular often distorts the pattern of investment in
such a way that the productivity of investment falls.
First, the major motives of aid donors are not to
increase efficiency and growth. Bilateral donors have
made it clear that their primary motive is to promote
the political, diplomatic, industrial and commercial
interests of the country offering foreign assistance.
Given that aid is not intended to accelerate growth, it
is unlikely that efficiency and growth would increase
except by chance. For example, the Economic Support
Fund of the US Agency for International Development
is explicitly intended to provide support to countries
on the basis of US political and security interests, and
about 40 per cent of all US bilateral aid comes from
this Fund.t'
Next, in order to maximise the political impact of their
foreign assistance, donors often prefer large and
prominent projects which can stand as monuments to
their generosity. Such projects, although possibly
successful in political terms, are unlikely to represent
an efficient use of investment resources or to make a
substantial contribution to growth. The bias in favour
of large, monumental projects is not confined to
bilateral donors. The EEC, for example, concentrates
much of its assistance on large-scale infrastructural
projects. All of us want to be seen to be generous.
Moreover, donor agencies understandably wish to
minimise their costs of administration, and this
predisposes them to favour a small number of large
projects rather than a large number of small projects.
The problem, however, is that a strategy that
minimises the cost of providing foreign aid is unlikely
to coincide with a strategy designed to make the most
effective use of investible resources. What is good for
the donor may not be particularly good for the
recipient.
Finally, there is the knotty problem of tied aid. Most
aid is tied in at least one of three different ways: to
projects, to capital rather than recurrent costs, and (in
the case of bilateral aid) to purchases from the donor
Il Political, military and strategic interests dominate the US aid
programme and account for the fact that Israel and Egypt in 198 l-2
received 31.4 per cent of total US bilateral assistance: OECD.
Development Cooperation, 1984. p.233.
country. For example, in the UK over 60 per cent of
our foreign aid is bilateral and 80 per cent of this is tied
to purchases from the donor country; in Canada,
80 per cent of CIDA's aid is tied to procurement in
Canada.
Tied aid introduces a series of inefficiencies into Third
World countries. It biases investment towards highly
capital- and foreign exchange-intensive projects. It
artificially increases the capital costs of aid-financed
projects, since goods obtained under tied aid will tend
to be significantly more expensive than similar goods
obtained at world prices. And it will also tend to
increase the operating costs of aid-financed projects,
since tied aid is likely to lead to a continuing flow of
relatively expensive imports in the form of spare parts
and ancillary equipment complementary to the aid-
financed imports. The ultimate effect of all this U is to
reduce the competitiveness of recipient countries, to
alter the pattern of investment and lower its
productivity and to reduce the rate of growth below
what it otherwise would have been.
Inequality, Poverty and Political Repression
Perhaps growth would not matter very much if it could
be shown that foreign capital, and especially foreign
aid, helps to reduce inequality and poverty and to
promote social justice and freedom. Unfortunately,
however, it is impossible to demonstrate this. Indeed, I
would go further: donor countries can in principle
concentrate their aid on the poorest countries
(although in practice they do not do so), but it is
almost impossible for donor countries to ensure that
their aid reaches the poorest people even if they wished
to do so [see Mosley 1981; Independent Group on
British Aid 1982, 1984). The most a donor can do is to
support governments whose domestic policies are
designed to ensure that the benefits of economic
activity accrue to the poor in full measure.
Alas, there is very little evidence that the governments
in the countries in our sample have made much effort
to reduce inequality in the distribution of income and
wealth. Moreover, circumstantial evidence suggests
that the concentration on industry and the neglect of
rural development have led to greatly increased
inequality in most countries. In fact, the problem is
more serious than this. Probably, the standard of
living of many poor people, particularly those in the
rural areas, has fallen substantially in the last 10 or 15
years. The neglect of the countryside has been so
extreme that in most countries agricultural production
has failed to keep pace with the expansion of the
population (Table 5).
2 Editorial Note: The evidence suggests that tying raises the cost of
purchases by 201050 per cent: J. White. The Politics of Foreign Aid,
St. Martins, London, 1972. p.151.
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Table 5
Source: IBRD, World Development Report 1983 (Oxford
University Press, 1983) World Development
Indicators, Tables 2, 19 and 21
In nine out of our 12 countries the agricultural labour
force accounts for at least 72 per cent of the total. The
fate of the poor depends primarily upon the
performance of this sector - less so in Benin,
Pakistan, and obviously Israel; but in general if
agriculture performs badly, poverty will increase.
Data on agricultural performance exist for 10 of our
countries. In only one, Tanzania, did agricultural
output per head increase. In one other (the Central
African Republic) there has been stagnation since
1970, and a precipitous decline in the 10 years before
that. In each of the remaining eight countries per
capita agricultural output fell in 1970-81: gently in
Bangladesh and Senegal, rapidly in Ethiopia, Zaire
and Madagascar, and in the other three (Haiti,
Pakistan and the Sudan) by between 0.4 and 0.8 per
cent a year. In all eight of these countries, therefore,
and possibly in the Central African Republic too,
there is a strong presumption that mass poverty has
increased. And this has occurred despite a substantial
inflow of foreign capital.
The poor have been neglected by their own
governments. Many governments are dictatorships -
usually a military dictatorship - and actively and
violently suppress the poor. Judging by our sample, it
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could well be argued that this applied to a greater or
lesser extent to Bangladesh, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Zaire,
Sudan, and Haiti.
In practice foreign aid is doing little to promote
growth in the Third World, and less to alleviate
poverty. In the end it appears to be doing little more
than sustaining corrupt and often vicious regimes in
power, sometimes deliberately (Guatemala, El
Salvador) and sometimes perhaps not. In either event,
the time may have come to abandon the enterprise, to
set ourselves the goal, not of increasing foreign aid,
but of reducing it gradually over, say, the next five
years to the minimum necessary to meet humanitarian
calls for emergency assistance. [For a similar proposal
see Seers 1983: 181-2.] We may well do more to help
the poor in future by being less paternalistic, by
supporting those in the Third World who favour a
policy of self-reliance'3 and by discontinuing long-
term programmes of foreign assistance.
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